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Abstract
The altruistic debate was initiated by Auguste Comte and was defined as “living for 
others”. Here, morally right actions are those that the consequences are more favourable 
than unfavourbale to everyone except the actor. Actions are considered altruistic when 
they are motivated by the desire to benefit others other than oneself for that person's sake. 
Comte's altruism is what one might call absolute altruism which is completely against 
individual personality, self-worth and self-esteem. Though there are moderate arguments 
for altruism which can be called degenerate forms of altruism which permit certain 
altruistic actions to be motivated by self-interest, this paper argued using Alfred Schutz's 
definition of human action as motivated behaviour to show the impossibility of altruism 
as envisaged by Auguste Comte.  The resercher proposed a redefinition of human values 
as reasoned behaviour if one is to accept absolute altruism of Comte. The paper 
concluded that human actions may be altruistic but motivated by egoistic concerns.

Keywords: Altruism, Egoism, Action, Collectivism, Objectivism. 

Introduction
Self love and preservation characterized human attitude towards life. Daily human 
actions affirm this assertion as true enjoying a strong support from ethical egoists. This 
ethical egoism which some philosophers call objectivism considers man as an end in 
himself and not as a means to the ends of others. Within the frame of this line of thought, 
the human person lives for his/her own sake and does not make it a duty to sacrifice 
himself for others and in the similar vein could not consider it an obligation for others to 
sacrifice themselves for him. He works for his rational self-interest targeting the 
achievement of self-realization and personal happiness as the highest good. This 
questions the possibility of altruism. Suhaib (2019) holds that “altruism was a coinage 
from Auguste Comte, and he summarized it as “living for others”. More generally, ethical 
altruism entails selfless concern for the welfare of others. The way the term is commonly 
used does not imply living for others, rather helping others in the pursuit of their ends” (p. 
3). It then means that what accounts for the altruist is the innate motivation to promote the 
welfare of others.
The motivation that underlies altruistic action seems to be at variance with Alfred 
Schutz's understanding of human action. Of course, Schutz's actions are also 
characterized by motives that seem contra-altruistic. Actions in Schutz's are determined 
by project which precedes the action in time. The project constitutes the primary and 
fundamental meaning of the action. These actions are conceived in a completed mode as 

THE ALTRUISTIC QUESTION AND ALFRED SCHULTZ'S 
DEFINITION OF HUMAN ACTION

Peter Iorhom Akunoko PhD
Department of Philosophy,

Benue State University,
Makurdi.

pakunoko@bsum.edu.ng

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if they are over and done with. They are conceived in the future perfect tense. The 
meaning of action can only be made evident when the motive is uncovered. The role of 
motives in the determination of the meaning of action was made clear by Schutz (1962) 
when he defined actions as “motivated behaviour”. (p.69)
The question that arises from his conception of action is whether there are purely altruistic 
motives, judging from the fact that self-love and self-actualization are intrinsic to man 
and primordial to human existence. One can then ask whether Schutz's definition of 
human actions as motivated behaviour is not a condition of altruistic impossibility. It is 
the task of this paper to ascertain whether pure altruistic actions exist or whether ethical 
egoism underlies every human action.

Ethical Altruism
Altruism simply means the placing of others above self, and also of their interests above 
personal interest. The term altruism was coined by Auguste Comte and summarized as 
“living for others” (Suhaib, 2019: p.3).  In line with this, Campbell (2006) maintained 
that it is Rand's view that “altruism means placing what is good for others above what is 
good for oneself”. (p.1) This paints an altruist as one who regards the good of others as 
essentially not hindered by concerns for the rights or dignity of individuals, who have as 
their major moral obligation to submerge themselves within the group or collective and 
abandon themselves for the collective interest.

Campbell (2006) noted that Comte, who sought to establish a new religion of “the Great 
Being, Humanity,” defined altruism as “living for others” (p.3). In living for others an 
individual must subordinate himself to the alter ego as the source of his stability. This 
condition is only realizable due to the impulse of propensities prompting man to live for 
others. When man fails in living for things outside him and lives only for himself alone, he 
is prone to be controlled by excitement. It follows that, happiness and worth, as well in 
individuals as in societies, depend on adequate ascendancy of the sympathetic instincts. 
Thus the expression, live for others, is the simplest summary of the whole moral code of 
positivism. (Comte 1973a, 565-566). The claim of altruism as a moral theory is that the 
moral obligation of man is to help others not minding whether it is at the expense of self-
interest. Moral altruism considers actions as morally right when the act favours the other 
even if to the disadvantage of the self. Such actions may be favourable to everyone except 
the actor or agent. Altruism is seen as the most potent way of expressing personality as it 
emphasizes sympathy which regulates individual existence as an intersubjective being. 
Comte (1973b) corroborates this with the view that “the ultimate systematization of 
human life must consist above all in the development of altruism (p.253).

Comte seems to have over emphasized altruism over personality and individual good, and 
could not realize that there cannot be any collectivism (which he favours) without 
individual personalities. His arguments point to the fact that self-regard or positive self-
evaluation must be deemphasized and feelings for others promoted. Comte rejected any 
claim of individual rights which is at variance to social duties and detested any kind of 
liberalism which for him is a kind of modern anarchy. His vision was for a Religion of 
Humanity which will be establish by the state with the function of training every citizen in 
altruism and discourage outbreaks of personality. (Campbell 2006: p.4).

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The objectivist Rand was one of the greatest critics of Comte's brand of altruism. In his 
book Virtue and Selfishness (1984: ch1) Rand expounds on his three cardinal values of her 
ethical system, namely “Reason, Purpose and Self-Esteem, with the corresponding 
virtues of Rationality, productiveness, pride”. It is important to note that for Rand, 
production is the central purpose of one's life, reason its source and pride the reward. 
These three values with corresponding virtues when applied make man an objectivist 
with self-interest as his ultimate goal of life. It was even difficult for Rand to accept the 
use of the term altruism as used by Comte. She labeled it variously as selflessness or 
collectivism. For Rand what it means to live for others is simply a form of “ethical 
collectivism or the old Christian-communist denial of self”. (Rand 1997; 85)

Rand equated altruism with living a second hand life and considers altruism to be an 
absolute evil (Rand, 1997, 244). Unfortunately, Rand later agreed with the Comtean 
definition of altruism which is a doctrine which holds that man must live for others and 
place others above self. From Rand the Comtean idea of altruism began to degenerate to 
take moderate forms. The degeneration of altruistic morality to a more liberal 
understanding became possible. According to Bass (2006)  

Altruism is the view that the interest of others matters in their 
own right, apart from the way they might impact upon one's own 
interests, and therefore that in varying degrees, it could be 
appropriate, desirable or morally required, on some occasions 
to act on behalf of others, even at some cost to one's interests 
(331).

This is a moderate way of defining altruistic morality. It is not completely anti personality 
and self-worth or esteem but promotes the good in helping others as a moral duty. 

Though the goal of my paper is to discuss altruism and establish its impossibility using 
Alfred Schutz's definition of action, it is important to look briefly on egoism. Ethical 
egoism has ontological foundations. Ayn Rand popularized the idea of ethical egoism or 
objectivism. Suhaib (2019) summarized Rand's understanding of egoism thus, 
“Man–every man–is an end in himself, not a means to the ends of others; he must live for 
his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself; he 
must work for his rational self-interest, with the achievement of his own happiness as the 
highest moral purpose of his life.” (p.2). Egoism is motivated by human personality and 
crave for self-actualization. Omelchuk (2013) notes that “self-actualization means 
absolutely different types of activity, which, however, are all directed by the belief in 
Being. It means that taking one's self as a body or mind at specific stages of personality 
formation, always enables one to go to some new levels of self-identification through 
self-transcendence. Self-transcendence in our opinion should be understood not as 
“going out of one's limits” but as going out of the limits of those who have lost their 
existential value of self-realization and self-identification”. (p.119) It is good note that 
man is in his essence a being that is in a continuous movement oriented towards the whole 
of reality around him but when this constant yearning for auto-transcendence halts it is 
probably a sign of full self- realization.

Ethical Egoism

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It is then intrinsic to the nature of man to always value his own happiness as the only 
foremost moral purpose of his life and to consider self-achievement-oriented endeavours 
noble and consider objective reality and his reason as the only absolute parameters in his 
life. This means that it is through reason that we can understand reality and this reason 
also provides a guide to human action. This reason grants man the status of an end in 
himself and not just a means for the ends of others. His rational self-interest and personal 
happiness underlie his actions including the seeming altruistic ones.  This is not a 
complete denial of the existence of certain altruistic actions. It is rather an affirmation of 
the fact that moderate forms of altruism are possible but only within the realm of reason 
without denying personality, self-worth, self-esteem and self-realiztion. This moderate 
understanding of altruistic action can be accommodated in Alfred Schutz's definition of 
human action.

Alfred Schutz's Understanding of Human Action
Human actions are determined by a preconceived motive I Schutz. It is the ongoing 
process of a human conduct or behaivour which the actor devised targeted at a projected 
end or goal. An act is a completed process of action, that is, the result or outcome. Schutz 
made a distinction between overt and covert action.  Covert action may be projected but 
not purposive. On the other hand, an overt action is geared towards the outer world and 
changes it. So, overt action is both projected and purposive (Schutz, 1962: p.67). 
Altruistic action is a form of an overt action in that it is both projected and purposive with 
the motive to serving the interest of others even when the action does not favour the actor. 
Actions are therefore, projected within the framework of time. It then means that 
ontology of time is the fundament of any action at all.

According to Schutz (1962) all projecting consists in an anticipation of future conduct by 
way of phantasyin. We have only to find out whether it is the future ongoing process of the 
action as it rolls on phase by phase or the outcome of this future action, the act imagined as 
having been accomplished, which is anticipated in the phantasying of projecting (p.68). 
For Schutz it is the completed action (act) which is the starting point of all our projecting. 
One has to visualize the state of affairs or outcome of one's future action before the action 
proper. What is anticipated here is not the future action but the future act. According to 
Schutz (1962) this act is anticipated in the future perfect tense, modo futuri exati (p.69). 
The time perspective that characterizes the project explains the relationship between the 
project and the different kinds of motives that necessitate actions.

Schutz (1962) defines actions as motivated behaviour (p.69). What actually differentiates 
action from mere behaviour is the project that characterized action. This project is 
anticipated in the future perfect tense, that is, as accomplished. Every action necessarily 
involves the anticipation of the future in the sense that it is future directed.  Schutz (1976) 
notes that “the distinguishing characteristic of action is precisely that it is determined by a 
project which precedes it in time. Action then is behaviour in accordance with a plan of 
projected behaviour; and the project is neither more nor less than the action itself 
conceived and decided upon in future perfect tense” (p.11). Actions are different from 
mere behaviour in that, actions are conscious while behaviour is unconscious. Actions 
take place through the process of retention and reproduction. In line with this Schutz 

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(1967) notes that “an action is conscious in the sense that before we carry it out, we have a 
picture in our mind of what we are going to do. This is the “projected act”. Then as we do 
proceed to action, we are either consciously holding the picture before our inner eye 
(retention), or we are from time to time recalling it to mind (reproduction) (p.63). The 
process of action involves retention of the projected act and also a reproduction of the 
projected act to keep track of the course of action.

Actions are grouped according to two kinds of motives. Schutz (1976) identified these 
motives as: in-order-to motive and the because motive”. (p.11). This motives underlie any 
kind of action and constitute the reason for the action. Schutz (1976) further notes that 
“the in-order-to motive refers to the future and is identical with the object or purpose for 
the realization of which the action itself is a means; it is “terminus ad quem.” The because 
motive refers to the past and may be called its reason or cause; it is a “terminus a quo” 
(p.11). Motives may have both a subjective and an objective meaning. The subjective 
meaning refers to the experience of the actor who lives in his ongoing process of activity. 
This is what the actor actually has in view as bestowing meaning upon his ongoing action. 
This according to Schutz (1952) is always the in-order-to motive, the intention of 
bringing about a projected state of affairs, of attaining a preconceived goal. (p.71) All 
actions including seeming altruistic ones have in-order-to motives which propel the actor 
to undertake the action. These motives are subjective and constitute the meaning for such 
actions. The subjective nature of in-order-to motive cast doubt on the possibility of 
genuinely altruistic acts. The genuine because motive is an objective category that is only 
accessible to the observer who has to reconstruct from the accomplished act that is, the 
outcome of the actor's action, including the attitude of the actor to his action. The actor 
himself can become an observer when he turns back and looks at his past and the state of 
affairs brought about by his actions. Only by this that he can succeed in grasping his 
genuine because motives of his own acts.

It is important to note the impossibility of understanding the other people's acts without 
first of all understanding the in-order-to motive and the because motive of such acts. 
Again, let us note that there are manifold degrees of understanding. These degrees of 
understanding limit my scope such that I cannot grasp the full ramifications of other 
people's motives. Schutz (1976) notes that “I cannot grasp the full ramifications of other 
people's motives, with their horizons of individual life plans, their background of 
individual experiences, their references to the unique situation by which they are 
determined. (p.12). Schutz (1976) further notes that “such an ideal understanding would 
presuppose the full identity of my stream of thought with that of the alter ego, and that 
would mean an identify of both ourselves (p.12). The problem of other minds is such that, 
for one to understand the exact content of the other's consciousness, one must become the 
other in all ramifications and such merger of consciousness is not possible. It then means 
that the in-order-to motives of the actor cannot be vividly grasped by the observer. As 
elusive as these motives may be to the external observer, they characterized all kinds of 
real human actions. It then means that altruistic acts are motivated. This cast doubt on the 
possibility of purely altruistic motives as conceived by Comte.

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Conclusion
The question that comes to my mind as I begin to write this conclusion is that, is ethical 
altruism possible? If yes, what kind and degree of altruism is realistic. Comte had initiated 
the altruistic debate and provided the foundation for other understandings of the concept 
of altruism. He construed altruism as living for others. We have stated earlier that Comte 
is the founder of positivism and championed a rational, scientific and social system that 
favours a total subjugation of the individual to the collective. His altruism was that which 
subjugates the self placing others above self and other's interest above one's own. His 
altruism comes against self-worth, self-esteem and personality in general. Campbell 
(2006) criticizes Comte on his over exaggeration of altruism and held that 'in pressing for 
altruism Comte exalted the emotions over the intellect (p.4).  Suhaib (2019) argued 
against Comte that “altruism does not have to involve loss for the individual self” (p.3). 
Suhaib proposes a categorization of altruism into strong altruism and weak altruism. 
Strong altruism encompasses acts that are undertaken despite them causing loss of the 
individual self's well-being. Weak altruism encompasses acts whose underlying motives 
(at least partly) involve benefiting others or preventing harm to them. (p.3)
Mercy (2019) in arguing against Comtean kind of altruism noted that “psychological 
altruism holds that humans have feelings of altruism in them. The psychological egoist 
would believe that those feelings spring forth from feelings of egoism” (p.173). It then 
means that the seeming altruistic acts are prompted by selfish motives. Mill (1865) 
criticizes Comte's extreme altruism. He notes 

because the good of the human race is the ultimate standard of 
right and wrong, and because moral discipline consists in 
cultivating the utmost possible repugnance to all conduct 
injurious to the general good, Comte infers that the good of 
others is the only inducement on which we should allow 
ourselves to act, and that we should endeavour to starve the 
whole of the desires which point to our personal satisfaction, 
by denying them all gratification not strictly required by 
physical necessities. The golden rule of morality in Comte's 
religion, is to live for others. To do as we would be done by, and 
to love our neighbour as ourselves, are not sufficient for him; 
they partake, he thinks, of the nature of personal calculations. 
We should endeavour not to love ourselves at all… All 
education and all moral discipline should have but one object, 
to make altruism predominate over egoism (p.138-139). 

This does not mean that Mill rejected altruism outrightly. However, altruism conflicted 
with Mill's utilitarianism.
Talcott Parsons' idea of human action contrasts completely with Comte's absolute 
altruism. Parsons (1991) argues that action does not consist only of ad hoc “responses” to 
particular situational “stimuli” but that the actor develops a system of “expectations” 
relative to his own need-dispositions and the probabilities of gratification or deprivation 
contingent on the various alternatives of action which he may undertake. (p.2). He notes 
that the acting ego expects a reaction of the alter ego. This reaction is anticipated in 
advance and it affects the choices of the actor. This is clearly in contrast to Comtean 
altruism but may not negate completely other degenerate forms of altruism.

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Alfred Schutz's definition of human action as motivated behaviour presents a situation 
that argues for altruistic impossibility. Though Schutz's goal was not to argue against the 
Comtean type of altruism, his definition of human action became a potent weapon against 
extreme altruism. However, there are moderate arguments for altruism which target the 
benefit of others without compromising completely the interest of the actor. This kind of 
altruism fits perfectly into Schutz's classification of motives. For altruism as expressed by 
Comte to have any chance at all, Schutz's understanding of human action needs to be 
redefined. In line with this, I defined human action as reasoned behaviour. This means 
that human action is a product of deliberation and choice. Since man is a rational animal 
his actions are not devoid of reasons. In line with this, FitzPatrick (2017) argues “you 
might explain your altruistic act toward a stranger in dire need by citing considerations 
you judge to be good reasons for so acting, i.e. considerations you take to show that so 
acting is in fact practically justified or good to do. You might similarly offer reasons for 
your feeling angry over someone else's action that, let us suppose, caused this person to be 
in such need in the first place. Such cases involve explaining ourselves by offering 
purportedly justifying reasons—considerations we took to justify our belief, action or 
feeling—within a space of reasoned discourse that invites demands for such justifying 
reasons and allows for critical challenges to those that are offered (i.e. asking whether the 
reasons offered are really good reasons for so believing, acting or feeling)” (p.3). All 
reasoned actions are motivated by certain reasons and may be motivated by feeling 
happiness when we see others happy or a reaction against the action or inaction of others 
that put people in certain dehumanizing conditions. These reasons could either be that of 
sympathy or empathy. This action when targeted at benefiting the other without 
necessarily compromising or neglecting the good of the actor are said to be altruistic. The 
underlining reasons for action may both be altruistic and egoistic in character and the state 
of affairs that the action may bring about (act).

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